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I. INTRODUCTION
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation,' the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, re-examined its Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)2
jurisprudence and assumed that a private domestic company acting in its
private capacity could be liable to Peruvian nationals under the ATCA for a
wide range of torts under international law, including violations of rights to
"life and health.",3  Previous cases and other Circuits held that only a
handful of egregious crimes, when committed by a private individual or
corporation, can justify private liability under the ATCA.a Rather than
abiding by these interpretations, however, the court examined in depth the
sufficiency of the Peruvians' claims without addressing the threshold issue
of private liability.5
Ultimately, the Flores court held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the Peruvians' environmental claims, styled as claims for
life and health.6 Nevertheless, the court raised the prospect of wide-ranging
* The author would like to thank her family for their love and support, Professor Susan
Provenzano for her insight and encouragement, and the 2004-2005 Editorial Board of the
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business for their assistance and
consideration.
1 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
2 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
3 Flores, 343 F.3d at 160.
4 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring) (suggesting that only a "handful of crimes" should lead to private liability
under the ATCA); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (suggesting
that only crimes "committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes" should engender private
liability); see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *9 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated,
en banc hearing granted 2003 WL 359787 (abiding by previous two courts to set a threshold
question for corporate liability as to whether the tort alleged fits into the egregious crimes
suggested in those cases).
5 See Flores, 343 F.3d at 160-72.
6 Id. at 172.
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ATCA liability by suggesting that if it had found sufficient consensus in
"customary international law" regarding the illegality of Southern Peru
Copper Corporation's intra-national Vollution, the claims may have been
granted subject matter jurisdiction. The court came to the proper
conclusion in rejecting subject matter jurisdiction. However, it wrongly
applied the holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala-which considered only state-
sponsored activity-to claims against a private corporation acting in its
private capacity.8 Whether this misplaced reliance on Filartiga and failure
to set a threshold standard for private corporate liability was intentional or
mistaken, it was a grave error, putting private corporations at risk for
snowballing private corporate liability under the ATCA.
The Flores court should have issued a more limited holding and re-
emphasized that private, non-state-sponsored actions will only engender
Filartiga-style9  ATCA analysis in a limited set of egregious
circumstances.'( Instead, as this note will examine, the court opened the
door for endless and unpredictable liability, double recovery, and forum-
shopping that could eventually stifle U.S. multi-national corporation
("MNC") investment and activity abroad, hamper the competitiveness of
U.S. MNCs abroad, and cost such companies millions of dollars in
extensive discovery and briefing on every claim brought in the Second
Circuit.1
The ideal solution to the problem presented by the Flores decision
would be for Congress or the Supreme Court to clarify all aspects of
liability under the ATCA, particularly corporate liability.12  While the
Id. at 160-72.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
9 As will 'be discussed in detail later in this note, the Second Circuit Court in Filartiga
reinstated the ATCA as a viable cause of action, and allowed an ATCA claim against a state-
sponsored entity who violated "universally accepted norms of. . .international law." See
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877.
10 Such limited ATCA liability was suggested in Judge Edward's concurrence in Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d at 794.
11 For the propositions that private corporate ATCA liability endangers U.S. MNCs in a
variety of ways, see Curtis Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 457, 471 (2001) (forum shopping and discovery legal costs); PETER MARBER,
FROM THIRD WORLD TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF EMERGING MARKETS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1998) (uncertainty of investment); Mark Gibney and R. David Emerick, The
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the Protection of Human Rights:
Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International Standards, 10 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1996) (MNCs will lose competitive advantage if subjected to U.S.
labor, environmental, and other such laws abroad); Harvard Law Review Association, Ninth
Circuit Uses International Law to Decide Applicable Substantive Law Under Alien Tort
Claims Act, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1531 (2003) (noting that in decisions such as Unocal,
extending liability to MNCs under Filartiga-style analysis could "strike deeply at the ability
of parties to organize their conduct and protect their expectations").
12 The suggestion that Congress or the Supreme Court needs to clarify the scope of the
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Supreme Court recently issued its long-awaited first decision addressing the
scope of the ATCA, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, it specifically left open the
corporate actor question under the ATCA.13 To respond to this confusion,
and to redress cases such as Flores, Congress and the Circuits must set a
standard which makes individual corporate liability a threshold question, as
in the Ninth Circuit's panel decision in Doe v. Unocal. 1
4
The Unocal decision sets a standard that provides an appropriate
balance between corporate liability in the most egregious circumstances and
jurisprudential stability which encourages investment abroad. If a U.S.-
based MNC's violation does not match one of the few egregious crimes
enumerated by the D.C. Circuit's Judge Edwards in his concurrence in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,15 and reiterated by the Second Circuit in
other cases, analysis under the broad Filartiga test should be precluded in
cases like Flores.
Part II of this note will explain the history of the ATCA and discuss
precedents in the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits that have led to private
corporate liability under the ATCA. Part III will detail the Flores decision.
Part IV will analyze Flores and argue that the court should have set a
threshold standard for private corporate liability. Finally, Part V will lay
out the detrimental consequences that the Flores decision will have on U.S.-
based MNCs abroad.
II. ATCA JURISPRUDENCE
A. History of the ATCA
The Alien Tort Claims Act, drafted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789, states that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
ATCA is shared by scholars and Circuit Court Judges alike. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
774 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("absent direction from the Supreme Court on the proper
scope of the obscure section 1350, I am not prepared to extend Filartiga's construction");
Bradley, supra note 11, at 471 (noting that Judge Edwards' observation in Tel-Oren is "even
more apt today, given recent expansions in" ATCA litigation).
13 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.20 (2004) (noting that "a related
consideration" that should be undertaken by other courts interpreting the ATCA under the
Filartiga standard "is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation").
14 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at *9. As mentioned above, at the time this article was
submitted, an en banc decision in Unocal was pending, as the Circuit opted to wait and
respond to the recent Supreme Court decision in Sosa. Regardless of the outcome of this en
banc rehearing in light of the Sosa decision, it is the contention of this note that the standard
set in the panel decision is the appropriate standard for addressing corporate ATCA claims,
for reasons that will be discussed.
15 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."16 The statute became law in a time
when the United States was a diplomatic infant, and it has been theorized
that "the intent of the section was to assure aliens access to federal courts to
vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state court, might blossom
into an international crisis."'1 7 The main original applications of the statute
were to piracy prevention, the resolution of claims arising under the laws of
prize, and the redress of offenses against ambassadors.' 
8
The statute lay rarely used until 1980, when the Second Circuit
sustained an action under the ATCA in the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.19
The main issue addressed by the Filartiga court was the definition of "law
of nations. ',20 The court settled on an evolving standard for determining
which torts are actionable under international law, rather than a historical
interpretation. A historical interpretation would have limited the statute's
reach to piracy and other such offenses, as it traditionally had been used.2'
The evolving standard allows for modem tort claims to arise under the
statute if a claimant can prove an international consensus on illegality under
customary international law.22 Customary international law is "composed
only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern," and has been established by
referencing treaties, multinational declarations and decisions, and
international legal scholarship.23  Possibly due to the proliferation of
American industrial activity abroad, the cause of action recognized under
Filartiga has recently been resurrected and applied to the private sector
activities of U.S.-based MNCs abroad.24  Most notably, the Second and
Ninth Circuits have heard several private sector ATCA cases, and have
been the most vociferous Circuits in applying the statute.25  While most
16 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
17 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (Edwards, J., concurring).
18 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 67 (Welsby ed. 1845).
'9 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
20 28 U.S.C. §1350.
21 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
22 id.
23 Id. at 154-62.
24 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 11, at 471 (noting that such litigation "has expanded
significantly"); Brad J. Kieserman, Comment: Profits and Principles: Promoting
Multinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH.
U.L. REv. 881, 883 (1999) (noting that due to the growth of MNC influence abroad, "human
rights advocates turned recently to federal civil litigation in an effort to exert pressure on
U.S.-based MNCs... [T]he primary statutory authority for these suits is the ancient and once
obscure Alien Tort Claims Act.").
25 See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *9
(9th Cir. 2002), vacated, en banc hearing granted by 2003 WL 359787.
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modem attempts to apply the ATCA to MNCs have been unsuccessful,
26
the sheer volume of claims against corporate entities displays an emerging
plaintiffs' bar and human rights litigation interest in this area. The pressure
to expand this statute's influence over U.S.-based MNCs looks as though it
will continue until either the Supreme Court or Congress directly addresses
the application of the Filartiga test to U.S.-based MNCs.
27
B. The Second Circuit's Landmark Filartiga Decision
As discussed, the Second Circuit resurrected claims under the ATCA
in a landmark 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pena-rala.28 An in-depth
discussion of the case is necessary for a full understanding of current
ATCA jurisprudence. The case dealt with a Paraguayan plaintiff suing a
Paraguayan government official for torture following the death of the
plaintiffs seventeen-year-old son.29 The case was first brought in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which narrowly
construed the "law of nations" 30 language in the ATCA to exclude torture,
26 This list has been adapted and updated from a list of unsuccessful ATCA claims
against MNCs provided by Kieserman, supra note 24, at 883; Cases against MNCs
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Adbullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. 2003 WL
22317923 (2d Cir. 2003); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Bigio
v. Coca Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,
730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1978); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv.,
Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973); Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D.
Fla. 2003); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Bano v.
Union Carbide Corp., 2000 WL 1225789 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp.
2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000); Friedman v. Bayer Corp., 1999 WL 33457825 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Roe
v. Unocal Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), dismissed with prejudice, No. CIV.A.96-1474, 1998 WL
92246 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); B.T. Shanker Hedge v. British Airways, No. 82-C-1410, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16469 (N.D. I11. Dec. 27, 1982); Trans-Continental Inv. Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the
Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Alomang v. Freeport- McMoRan, Inc.,
No. 96-9962 (Civ. Dist. for the Parish of Orleans Div. H-12 1997) (dismissing also for
exception to venue), aff'd on reh'g, 718 So. 2d 971 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, No.
98-C-1352, 1998 La. LEXIS 2308 (La. July 2, 1998). Cases against MNCs dismissed for
forum non conveniens, see Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Carmichael v.
United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988); Robert v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,
2002 WL 1268030 (N.D. Tex, 2002); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v.
Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Alomang v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No.
CIV.A.96-2139, 1996 WL 601431 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996); Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v.
Compania de Acero Del Pacifico S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
27 Bradley, supra note 11, at 471.
28 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
29 Id. at 878.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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and denied subject matter jurisdiction, dismissing plaintiffs complaint.3'
Plaintiff appealed, and the Second Circuit Court reversed, holding that
"deliberate torture committed under color of official authority violates...
international law." 32 This holding seems relatively narrow, applying only to
torture by a government official; however, the court set a broad standard for
determining which torts fall under "international law" and can be claimed
under the ATCA.33 To determine which torts can be claimed, the court
outlined sources to be used in finding an international consensus on
illegality. 34 The court applied a broad definition of modern international
common law, capable of evolving to include new torts as the international
community reaches a consensus on their repugnancy. 35 Thus, the decision
left MNCs and other ATCA defendants exposed to evolving liability in later
cases. In summary, Filartiga ruled that the ATCA "authorizes US federal
courts to adjudicate suits between foreign parties concerning violations of
international human rights standards, and that such adjudications are
consistent with the federal judicial power authorized by Article III of the
Constitution. 36
More specifically, the court held that the ATCA "open[ed] the federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international
law., 37 In determining which rights are recognized by international law, the
court suggested that an "international consensus" '38 on the illegality of the
action must be proved, looking to "international accords and unilateral
action., 39  In cases where plaintiffs make general tort claims under the
ATCA and "'there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision," the court held that "resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations [and] the works of jurists.' 40 The
court then proceeded to analyze whether an international consensus existed
regarding the legality of torture. Among other sources, the court
3 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
32 Id. at 878.
33 For the proposition that Filartiga sets a broad standard, see Beth Stephens, Translating
Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for
International Human Rights Abuses, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2002) (suggesting Filartiga
invokes a "broad doctrine"). See also Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct?
Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1001, 1011 (2001) (suggesting Filartiga is "sweeping").
34 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
31 Id. at 876.
36 See Bradley, supra note 11, at 457. Note that ordinarily ATCA defendants must be
served process while in the United States, although efforts have been made at serving
defendants while visiting the United Nations. Bradley, supra note 11, at 469-70.
31 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
31 Id. at 884.
" Id. at 889.
40 Filartiga, 630 F.3d at 881 (quoting The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
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referenced: U.N. Resolutions, Harvard Law Review articles, American
Conventions, and International Covenants.41  This test, although accepted
by many scholars,42 has been described as a "broad doctrine [that]
encompasses a wide range of administrative and judicial remedies for
claims that may be styled as human rights violations, torts, or crimes,
against both domestic and foreign defendants, for violations committed
both at home and abroad.,
43
However, the court tempered the breadth of the test by suggesting that
its main holding dealt strictly with torture committed through state action,
under color of law, and perhaps was not meant to have broad-reaching
effects and complete mutability. It specified that "deliberate torture
perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights" and that the ATCA
"provides federal jurisdiction" upon "torturers ... within our borders.""
The limited nature of this holding is overlooked by courts, including the
Second Circuit itself in Flores, which apply the Filartiga test without
considering its "official authority" language.
Because Filartiga sets an evolving standard for determining which
torts are actionable under the ATCA, it allows for claims far outside the
historical scope of the ATCA, 46 engendering a debate amongst the Circuits
as to its applicability both to state-sponsored and private actions. Two
circuits have explicitly followed the standard, but another has strictly
limited it. 4 7 The resolution of this Circuit split, as it relates to corporate
liability, will have enduring ramifications.
C. Codification of Filartiga in the TVPA
Congress took note of the Filartiga decision and legitimized the
court's holding in a limited sense by providing a cause of action against
state actors committing torture under color of law in the Torture Victim's
Protection Act ("TVPA"). 48 This act was codified as part of the ATCA.
41 Id. at 884.
42 Christopher P. Meade, From Shanghai to Globocourt: An Analysis of the "Comfort
Women's " Defeat in Hwang v. Japan, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 250 (2002).
43 Stephens, supra note 33, at 3.
44 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877 (emphasis added).
45 id.
46 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 18.
47 See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1lth Cir. 1996); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (all
accepting and applying the Filartiga standard). But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Al-Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting Filartiga-style
analysis).
48 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-408, 106 Stat. 73 (1991) (codified as
Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 25:205 (2004)
The TVPA directly incorporates Filartiga's holding, stating that "an
individual who, under actual or apparent authority or under color of law of
any foreign nation... [commits] torture. shall be liable for damages in a
civil action."49  Thus, the TVPA imposes a state action requirement.
Furthermore, the TVPA expressly expands its breadth to cover U.S.
nationals who are tortured abroad, not strictly foreign nationals, as the
ATCA covers.5° Congress noted that this specific codification of a torture
claim in no way limits the evolution of other international common law
claims under the ATCA, thus distinguishing the two statutes' subject
matter.5 ' However, Congress did not distinguish the scope of liability of the
TVPA from the ATCA. 5 The scope of liability for the TVPA includes only
acts committed under color of law, as interpreted under § 1983, or under an
agency theory.5 3 Therefore, considering that the scope of coverage of the
Acts is similar, an argument can be made that the ATCA requires state
action as well, as will be discussed later in this article.
D. Rejection of Filartiga by the D.C. Circuit
Congress enacted the TVPA not only in response to the breadth of
Filartiga, but also in response to the D.C. Circuit's questioning of the
Filartiga standard.54 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the D.C. Circuit
ruled on a case filed against the Palestine Liberation Organization and
others by victims of an attack on a civilian bus in Israel in 1984.55 All three
concurrences in the Court's per curiam opinion rejected the plaintiffs'
claims and called for a narrower reading of the ATCA than Filartiga had
advanced.56  Tel-Oren is particularly important because Judge Edwards'
concurrence was the first time a major Circuit Court judge addressed the
issue of private liability under the ATCA.57
Judge Edwards agreed with the mode of analysis of the Filartiga
standard-determining customary international law through various treaties
49 id.
50 Id.
51 S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
52 Id. at 8.
53 ld.
54 Id. at 4-5.
" Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
56 See id. at 776 (Edwards, J. concurring) (Judge Edwards was "not prepared to extend
Filartiga's construction of [the ATCA] to encompass this case"). See also id. at 799 (Bork
J. concurring) (limiting jurisdiction under ATCA to only the explicitly referenced violations,
either a violation of a treaty or violation of one of the original law of nations violations cited
by Blackstone, piracy, etc.); See also id. at 823 (Robb J. concurring) (cases such as this
under ATCA are non-justiciable under the political question doctrine).
"7 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776.
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and other sources of law-when applied to government actors.58 However,
he suggested limiting private liability under the ATCA to a "handful of
crimes," such as slave trading and piracy.59 Edwards went on to determine
that torture is not "among the handful of crimes to which the law of nations
applies individual liability." 60 This limitation has been cited with approval
by the Second and Ninth Circuits.61
E. The Second Circuit Applies the ATCA to Private Entities in the Kadic
Decision
Fifteen years after the Filartiga decision, the Second Circuit took an
opportunity to "build upon the foundation" of Filartiga and extended
ATCA liability to private parties where the crimes verged on "genocide. 62
In Kadic v. Karadzic, citizens of Bosnia brought suit against Karadzic, the
head of Serb military forces, claiming various torts and crimes including
"rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture and summary
execution., 63  The court held that, although Karadzic was a private
individual, the claim was actionable because such conduct "violate[s] the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals."
64
This is a broad reading, but it is limited in the sense that it suggests
that only extreme crimes such as genocide will give rise to private ATCA
liability. Thus, it abides by the D.C. Circuit, settling genocide-related
crimes into the "handful 6  of extremely offensive crimes that Judge
Edwards suggested in Tel-Oren should engender individual private liability
subject to the Filartiga standard. It has been noted that this step toward
private corporate liability was an expansion of Filartiga, but it was limited
by the requirement that Karadzic could only be charged with private
liability for those actions that were committed in pursuit of genocide.66
This limitation has been overlooked by those claimants latching onto the
allowance of private liability signaled in Kadic, leading to the flood of
ACTA cases against private actors for non-genocide-related private actions.
" Id. at 792.
'9 Id. at 794-795.
60 id.
61 Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 at 240; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 at *1 (9th Cir.
Sept. 18, 2002).
62 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.
63 Id. at 237.
' Id. at 239.
65 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794.
66 Samuel A. Khalil, The Alien Tort Claims Act and Section 1983: The Improper Use of
Domestic Laws to 'Create' and 'Define' International Liability for Multi-National
Corporations, 31 HOFsTRA L. REv. 207, 222 (2002).
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F. Other Circuits Respond to Kadic
In the wake of Kadic, plaintiffs have seized the opportunity to file suits
against MNCs acting in their private capacities, as opposed to those acting
in accordance with foreign governments. However, only one such case has
survived summary judgment on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.67
Even fewer have addressed the issue of whether Kadic's expansion of
Filartiga should be applied to corporations and, if so, whether the torts
alleged fall into the "handful" of crimes suggested in Tel-Oren. Two cases
cited by Flores have dealt with environmentally based ATCA claims
against MNCs in light of Tel-Oren and Kadic, and have handled the issue of
private corporate liability in contrasting ways. 68 One case fails to address
the private actor issue, and the other devotes analysis to the private actor
consideration.
The Flores court relies on a Southern District of New York case,
Amlon Metals v. FMC Corp.,6 9 which disregards the consideration of
whether the torts claimed under the ATCA are sufficiently egregious to
engender private corporate liability, as per the Tel-Oren "handful" analysis.
Amlon puts forth the proposition that environmental tort allegations against
a U.S.-based MNC can be considered under Filartiga-style analysis.
However, Amlon makes no reference to whether environmental torts are
sufficiently egregious to impose liability on a private actor.7 ° This case
demonstrates the danger of ignoring Tel-Oren and Kadic when dealing with
ATCA claims against private corporations.
Amlon deals with an ATCA claim by a British corporation's U.S. agent
against Amlon, a Delaware corporation, alleging environmental and other
torts arising from Amlon's shipment of material to the British corporation.
The British corporation claimed the material posed "imminent and
substantial danger to human health and to the environment." The district
court did not devote one word of its opinion to the fact that both parties
were private corporations, but rather launched directly into Filartiga
analysis, namely the analysis of whether the international community
recognizes the action as illegal, based on various sources of law. 71 The
court came to the proper conclusion in dismissing the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, but did so in a way which allowed Flores to
ignore the threshold issues of private liability under the ATCA.
However, the Flores court cites to another case against a private
67 See case list, supra note 26.
68 See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
69 id.
70 See Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 668. See also Flores, 343 F.3d at 146 (discussion of
Amlon).
71 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877.
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corporation that had arisen in the wake of Tel-Oren and Kadic. This case
did address the private liability issue. The Flores court relied on the
environmental and corporate ATCA case Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc.72 to analyze customary international law.73 In Beanal, an ATCA suit
was filed by citizens of an Indonesian tribe, claiming that environmental
abuses of Freeport-McMoran in its mining operations amounted to genocide
against the tribe.
74
The Beanal court found that the facts of genocide were not sufficiently
pled, so it "need[ed] not address whether state-action [was] required to
sustain an action for individual human rights violations."'7 In making this
statement, the court openly acknowledged that the private actor issue was
an important consideration. The Beanal holding hinged on the fact that
"neither the court nor the plaintiff was able to identify, absent state action,
any germane universal norm in customary international law that could
establish private corporate ATCA liability for environmental practices
harmful to an indigenous tribe. 76 Unfortunately, this aspect of the holding
is overlooked in Flores, which clearly foregoes in-depth consideration of
the private actor issue.
G. Discussion of Doe v. Unocal
While the Flores court failed to adequately consider the implications
of extending ATCA liability to U.S.-based MNCs acting in their private
capacity, the recent Doe v. Unocal case thoroughly addressed the pertinent
issues while controversially extending liability to a U.S.-based MNC.
7 7
Although decided prior to Flores, this case was ignored by the Second
Circuit in its decision. Although an en banc rehearing of Unocal was
pending at the time this article was written, the standard set out by the panel
stands as an example of well-crafted ATCA analysis.
78
The Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Unocal addressed claims by residents of
Myanmar against Unocal for the corporation's alleged enslavement of
workers and other torts in connection with the construction of an oil
72 Beanal, 197 F.3d at 161.
73 Flores, 343 F.3d at 160.
74 Beanal, 197 F.3d at 163. Note that this skillfully-crafted case illustrates awareness of
the precedent of Tel-Oren and Kadic, asserting a hybrid genocide-environmental claim,
because at that time only genocide had been a sufficient violation to engender private
liability under Kadic.
71 Id. at 166.
76 See Kieserman, supra note 24, at 914.
77 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
78 Unocal, 2003 WL 359787 at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003), vacating decision and
ordering en banc hearing.
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pipeline in that country.79 The court held that such activity is actionable
under the ATCA.8 ° Most importantly, the court is the first to note that
"another threshold question in any ATCA case against a private party is
whether the alleged tort requires the private party to engage in state action
for ATCA liability to attach, and if so, whether the private party in fact
engaged in state action."81 In other words, the court made a threshold
question of whether the tort claimed is sufficiently egregious to fall into
Judge Edwards' "handful. 82 If so, state action would not be required, and
ATCA liability against the private party could attach.83
The court held that under Tel-Oren and Kadic the slavery-like forced
labor imposed by Unocal on the Myanmar workers constituted a
sufficiently egregious violation of customary international law, and
deserved private liability.84 After making this threshold determination, the
court went on to analyze the facts of the case under the Filartiga method,
looking at various authorities to determine whether there was a consensus
that the tort of forced labor violated the law of nations. In light of this
careful analysis, the court reversed a lower court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants on the issue of aiding and abetting forced
labor. 85 The court went on to similarly consider the Myanmar residents'
ATCA claims concerning Unocal's aiding and abetting murder, rape and
torture. 86 The court applied the threshold inquiry to find that murder, rape
and torture committed in furtherance of forced labor was sufficiently
egregious to engender private liability.8 7 Then the court undertook fact-
based Filartiga-style analysis of each tort, and reversed summary judgment
for the defendants on all grounds except torture.
88
Even though both the Second and Ninth Circuits addressed the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction for private entities or corporations and came to
different conclusions in Kadic and Unocal, there was some semblance of
logical consistency in abiding by Edwards' soundly-reasoned and widely
accepted "handful 89 analysis as a threshold to private liability and Filartiga
analysis. In contrast, Flores did away with the Tel-Oren-style
considerations, jumping directly into Filartiga analysis of the Peruvian's
79 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
80 Id.




85 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at *9.
86 Id. at 15.
87 Id.
88 ld. at 9-17.
89 Id.
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claims while failing to note that the alleged offenses did not fall into
Edwards' "handful.'9°
H. The Supreme Court's Response: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The Supreme Court addressed ATCA liability for the first time in a
meandering, thirty-page opinion that denied a Mexican national's claim
based on his alleged kidnapping by U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
officials. 91 In Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, the majority opinion found that the
kidnapping offense "violate[d] no norm of customary international law so
well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy" via the
ATCA.92  In its opinion, the majority applied limited Filartiga-style
analysis, and cautioned that "the door" for ATCA claims "is still ajar
subject to vigilant door-keeping, and thus open to a narrow class of
international norms today." The majority noted that this view was
"consistent with the reasoning of many courts and judges who faced the
issue before it reached this Court," such as Filartiga and Tel-Oren.
93
The Court suggested that Congressional guidance on the scope of what
constitutes "norms of customary international law" under the ATCA, akin
to the affirmative guidance offered by the TVPA, would be welcome.
94
However, until such guidance is available, it seems from this opinion that
Filartiga-style analysis remains valid. In the most troubling aspect of the
case, the Court specifically failed to address corporate ATCA liability,
noting that careful judicial judgment is required in considering "whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such
as a corporation," but failed to explicitly adopt the "handful" requirement. 95
Therefore, without sufficient guidance from the Supreme Court, the Unocal
threshold analysis remains the most viable standard for addressing
corporate ATCA liability.
It is unclear how the Circuits will interpret the Sosa decision in the
coming year. However, it is important to note that the Unocal case has been
vacated and an en banc hearing scheduled, but no decision had been
rendered by the time this article was written.96 Ideally, the Circuit en banc
90 Id.
91 Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2769.
92 Id.
9' Id. at 2765-66.
94 Id. at 2765 (noting that "we would welcome any Congressional guidance in exercising
jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations," and Congress "may
modify or cancel any judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international
norm").
9' Id. at 2766 n.20.
96 See Order Vacating Decision and Ordering En Banc Hr'g, 2003 WL 359787, (9th Cir.
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will do what the Supreme Court failed to, and maintain their threshold
analysis, regardless of how they hold in light of Sosa's cautionary language.
If the Circuit fails to do so, it will vindicate careless decisions such as
Flores, which launch into Filartiga analysis of the liability of corporations
without jumping the hurdle of the private liability threshold wisely
suggested by the three-judge panel in Unocal.
III. THE FLORES CASE
A. Procedural History
The Flores case was originally brought by residents of Ilo, Peru under
Texas state common law, but the case was successfully removed to Texas
federal court based on federal question jurisdiction and diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. A claim under the ATCA
was never alleged, but the state tort claims were dismissed based on the
facts that Peru provided an adequate alternative forum, private and public
interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal and dismissal was warranted
under the doctrine of comity of nations.98 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the action based on
forum non-conveniens and comity among nations.99
The re-filing of this case by new plaintiffs, other residents of Ilo, as an
ATCA claim in the ATCA-activist Southern District of New York on
December 28, 2000 is a classic example of forum shopping, and serves as
evidence of the Second Circuit and its feeder courts' unique laxity in
application of the ATCA against corporations. 00 The re-filed Flores case
was denied subject matter jurisdiction by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York on July 16, 2002,1°1 and this opinion was affirmed by
a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, in the opinion under
102consideration in this Note, on August 23, 2003.
B. Facts of the Case
Southern Peru Copper Corporation ("SPCC") was accused by injured
Peruvian citizens and their survivors of releasing copper residue and heavy
Feb 14, 2003).
97 Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
98 id.
99 Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
1oo See Bradley, supra note 11, at 471.
101 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd 343 F.3d
140 (2d Cir. 2003).
102 Flores, 343 F.3d at 140.
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metals into the air and water in and around Ilo, Peru.10 3 Plaintiffs claim
these emissions caused severe lung disease and other ailments, as well as
environmental pollution.10 4 However, plaintiffs did not allege the usual
torts of bodily injury or environmental abuses; rather, they filed their claim
under the ATCA, alleging violations of the "right to life," "right to health"
and "right to a sustainable environment."' 5 This may have been due, in
part, to the fact that the Peruvian government had already inspected and
levied sanctions on SPCC for environmental abuses and violations of
Peruvian environmental law.'
0 6
C. District Court Opinion
Defendant SPCC filed a motion to dismiss the Peruvians' ATCA
complaint on March 5, 2001, alleging a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to allege a
violation of the law of nations. 10 7 Judge Haight, writing for the District
Court majority, first analyzed the general principles of ATCA
jurisprudence, discussing Filartiga, and citing Kadic's holding "that under
modern international law, 'certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or
only as private individuals."",108 However, the court did not opine further on
whether the "right to life" and "right to health" environmental torts'0 9
claimed by the Peruvians constitute those "certain forms of conduct,"" 0 that
engender private liability. Rather, the court glossed over the point, and
delved into a Filartiga analysis of "plaintiff's claims under international
law."'11'
In doing so, the District Court diligently followed the Filartiga
guidelines, citing U.S. case law, international declarations, and the works of
jurists and scholars, 1 2 in an attempt to determine whether the plaintiffs
provided sufficient evidence of a consensus of customary international law
to support a claim. The court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs
103 Id. at 143.
104id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 144.
107 id.
08 Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
109 Id. at 514.
1i0 Id. at 513.
SId. at 514.
112 Id. at 514-19 (discussing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 668-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 161-68 (5thCir. 1999)).
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failed to identify any "conduct" on SPCC's part "that is universally
prohibited,"'1 13 and granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 14 However, the court noted that the
failure to find subject matter jurisdiction precluded a need "to decide
whether such a prohibition would apply to private actors or state actors," or
whether SPCC "was a state 
actor."' 5
y
D. Circuit Court Opinion
The Peruvians appealed their claim to Second Circuit Court, which
decided the case on August 29, 2003, affirming the District Court's
summary judgment for the defendants based on failure of subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATCA.116
In a unanimous three-judge opinion, the court began by detailing the
facts and procedural history of the case, as discussed above.' 7 The opinion
then laid out the history of the ATCA, adopting the view that the statute
"was intended to provide a broad remedy for all torts in violation of
international law, as that body of law might evolve over time." 1 8 The court
then outlined the Filartiga decision, discussing its significance in opening
the Federal courts to claims by aliens under the statute, its method for
determining whether actions constitute breaches of customary international
law, and the requirement of international consensus on the illegality of the
act claimed under the ATCA. 119 The opinion continued by discussing
Filartiga's varied reception by the Federal Circuit Courts, and the failure of
the Supreme Court to clarify the law in this area. 120 Judge Cabranes then
discussed the codification of Filartiga in the TVPA, and concluded that the
Filartiga standard was the operative standard under which to consider the
Peruvian's claim.121
Buried within the court's detailed discussion of Filartiga was a brief
mention of the Kadic decision, 122 which extended Filartiga analysis to
private individuals and corporations. Kadic was immensely important to
the validity of the Peruvians' claims in this case because it set a limit on the
types of claims that are justiciable under the ATCA against private entities.
113 Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
114 Id. at 525.
115 Id. The court went on to consider and analyze the defendant's forum non conveniens
arguments, which are not at issue in this consideration of the case.
116 Flores, 343 F.3d at 140.
... Id. at 143-148.
118 Id. at 149.
"1 Id. at 149-50.
120 Id. at 151-52.
121 Id. at 152-53.
122 Flores, 343 F.3d at 150.
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However, this issue was glossed over by the court in one paragraph, which
stated that "acts of piracy, slave trading, war crime and genocide violate
customary international law regardless of whether they are undertaken by
state or private actors whereas... torture and 'summary execution'
constitute violations only when committed by state officials or under color
of law.' 23 This constituted the only discussion of the private liability issue
in Flores. The court failed to determine whether the Peruvians' claims fit
into the Kadic or Tel-Oren standards for private liability, and failed to give
any reasoning for its disregard of this issue.
The court then delved into Filartiga analysis of the Peruvians' claims
by laying out the "definition of 'Law of Nations,' or 'Customary
International Law' for the purposes of the ATCA."' 124 Then the court
explained that for "a principle to become a part of customary international
law, States must universally abide by it," as per Filartiga, and must exhibit
"mutual concern" about the tort. The court then discussed the various
"sources and evidence of Customary International Law" presented by the
Peruvians to support their claim under the Filartiga standard, and rightfully
concluded that the presented evidence did not constitute "competent
evidence of customary international law."' 125 Thus, the Circuit affirmed the
District Court's grant of summary judgment for SPCC. 126 The court then
cursorily dismissed the Plaintiff s forum non conveniens claims. 127
IV. ANALYSIS OF FLORES AND MNC LIABILITY UNDER THE
ATCA
The Second Circuit's decision in Flores failed to sufficiently address
the issue of private corporate liability under the ATCA. As discussed, 128
other Courts have considered this issue in depth, some setting a threshold
requirement for establishing private corporate ATCA liability. This
precedent constitutes a superior alternative standard, supported by decisions
such as Kadic and Unocal, which the Court should have employed.
Alternatively, construing the ATCA in pari materia with the Congressional
codification of Filartiga in the TVPA would address the issue of private
corporate liability by barring claims under the ATCA unless committed
under color of law. The court in this case should have used one of these
alternative standards to avoid the devastating effects that will arise from
Filartiga analysis of every ATCA claim brought against a U.S.-based MNC
by a foreign national. These consequences will be addressed in Part (B) of
123 id.
124 Id. at 171.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 172.
127 Flores, 343 F.3d at 172.
128 See supra Part II.F.
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this Section and include: endless evolution of liability leading to uncertainty
and reduced investment, double recovery as a competitive disadvantage,
increased legal costs, and forum shopping.
A. Alternative Standards Ignored by the Court
There were two other standards available to the Flores court in
analyzing the issue of private corporate liability: setting private corporate
liability as a threshold question, as the court did in Unocal, or interpreting
the ATCA in pari materia with the TVPA, which would preclude actions
under the ATCA against private corporate defendants acting in their private
capacity.
1. Setting a Threshold Standard for Corporate Liability, as in Unocal
As previously discussed, 29 the Ninth Circuit's Unocal decision
considered private liability as a threshold question before considering
plaintiffs' ATCA claims under the Filartiga standard.130 The court deftly
interwove the jurisprudence of Kadic, Tel-Oren and Filartiga to determine
that private corporate liability under the ATCA requires the commission of
certain crimes, such as "slave trading, genocide or war crimes."'131 The
court then analogized the forced labor claim in the case to slavery: "[f]orced
labor is a modem variant of slavery to which the law of nations attributes
individual liability such that state action is not required.' '132 Also, they
rightfully concluded that, as per Tel-Oren, "slave trading is 'among the
handful of crimes'. . .to which the law of nations attributes individual
liability."'3 Such analysis preceded the court's Filartiga analysis of each
claim asserted in the case, thus suggesting that the lengthy, detailed, time-
consuming Filartiga analysis would be unnecessary had private liability not
been found.
134
Had the Flores claims been considered under this threshold, they
would not have survived, and corporate liability would not have been
possible. The threshold set by Unocal outlines three crimes that would
engender private corporate liability - slave trading, war crimes and
genocide - as well as crimes such as rape, torture and summary execution
when "committed in furtherance other crimes like slave trading, genocide or
war crimes."' 135 Clearly, pollution's endangerment of the "right to life" and
129 See supra Part II.H.
130 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976 at *9.
131 Id.
132 id.
133 Id. at 9 (omitted text in original) (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794-95).
134 Id.
135 Id.
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the "right to health," do not fall into these categories. 136  It would be
difficult to argue that pollution resulting from industrial activity constituted
genocide or arose in the pursuit of genocide. Furthermore, the pollution
itself was found to be a violation, thus precluding this possible argument.'
37
Strengthening this threshold would be desirable, as it would simplify
the process of adjudicating ATCA claims, decrease uncertainty over
liability for U.S.-based MNCs, and reduce legal costs by eliminating the
need for extensive briefing of Filartiga issues. The Supreme Court failed to
adopt such a standard in its recent majority opinion in the Sosa case, likely
because Sosa did not deal with a corporate tortfeasor1 38 However, the
majority of the Court in Sosa suggested that the issue of corporate ATCA
liability should be carefully considered by lower courts.' 39 The Unocal
standard should be adopted by the Circuits, and ideally by Congress, in
addressing corporate ATCA liability in the wake of Sosa's ambiguity. The
Unocal standard supplies the appropriate balance between corporate
responsibility and encouragement of foreign investment.1 40  Such an
interpretation rightfully places the responsibility of regulating corporations'
environmental emissions and working conditions on foreign governments.
2. Construction In Pari Materia with TVPA to Require State Action
If the threshold standard remains ambiguous, another possibility for a
workable standard would be to construe the ATCA in pari materia with the
TVPA, 141 which requires state action for all claims. The in pari materia
canon of statutory construction suggests that statutes that are on the same
subject should be construed together, and any ambiguities in one statute can
be resolved by looking at the other. 42  The TVPA was enacted as an
addition to the ATCA, and covers the similar subject of alien liability for
tort, thus making the statutes eligible for such construction.1
43
The TVPA states that "an individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation [commits] torture shall be
136 Flores, 343 F.3d at 143.
137 Id.
138 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755-69.
139 Id. at 2761-63.
140 See MICHAEL RATNER & BETH STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
IN U.S. COURTS 233-38 (1996) (suggesting that the ATCA, when properly enforced against
human rights violators, could encourage corporate responsibility).
141 Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, supra note 48.
142 In pari materia refers to statutes "on the same subject; relating to the same matter,"
and "is a canon of construction that statues that are in pari materia may be construed
together so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute
on the same subject." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (2nd Pocket Ed. 2001).
141 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991); Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, supra note 48.
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liable to that individual."' 44 Since the scope of the ATCA is ambiguous on
the state action issue, Congress' specific drafting of the TVPA-a note to
the ATCA-to require state action, can be interpreted as clearing up the
ATCA's ambiguity on this issue, thus requiring state action under the
ATCA as well. 45 Furthermore, Congress specifically noted that the TVPA
does not preclude liability for other torts besides torture under the ATCA,
thereby 4rotecting the scope of the types of torts actionable under the
ATCA.' 6 Thus, Congress commented on the ATCA, and had the
opportunity to suggest that the "state actor" limitation written into the
TVPA did not apply to the ATCA. However, Congress chose not to limit
the state action requirement specifically to the TVPA, suggesting that
Congress interpreted the ATCA to require state action in all cases.
1 47
Indeed, the state action requirement of the TVPA has been strictly
imposed. In Beanal, the Fifth Circuit suggested that the definition of
"individual" in the TVPA may not encompass corporations. 148 In Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit itself applied, an in pari
materia interpretation of the statutes.1 49 The court stated that "[w]hatever
may have been the case prior to passage of the TVPA, we believe plaintiffs
make a strong argument in contending that the present law, in addition to
merely permitting U.S. District Courts to entertain suits alleging violation
of the law of nations, expresses a policy favoring receptivity by our courts
to such suits" under the ATCA."5 ° This suggests that the court considers the
TVPA an extension of the ATCA, the language of which is operative on the
ATCA. Such an interpretation suggests that the TVPA's bar against private
corporate liability should be extended to the ATCA.
An in pari materia interpretation of the ATCA with the TVPA offers a
predictable and corporation-friendly interpretation of the ATCA. Ideally, in
response to the Supreme Court's request for Congressional guidance on
ATCA claims in the majority opinion of the recent Sosa case, Congress
would respond by amending the ATCA to include specific causes of action,
and a state action requirement, akin to its drafting of the TVPA. 5'
B. Consequential Problems with Flores-Style Analysis
As discussed above, adopting Flores-style analysis of ATCA claims,
which subjects private corporations to Filartiga analysis with no threshold
144 Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, supra note 48.
141 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991); Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, supra note 48.
146 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
141 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 8 (1991).
148 Beanal, 197 F.3d at 169.
149 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
150 Id. at 105.
151 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765.
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determination for private liability, will have significant negative
consequences for U.S.-based MNCs.
1. Endless Evolution ofLiability Leading to Uncertainty and Reduced
Investment
The court in Flores adheres to the Filartiga standard, which provides
that torts actionable under the ATCA increase as customary international
law evolves and as the international community recognizes more crimes and
torts as mutually illegal. 152 Without a clear minimum threshold, liability for
corporations may snowball to include less egregious torts such as
environmental and labor violations. Furthermore, it is even possible that
legal obligations under the ATCA could be imposed ex post facto on U.S.-
based MNCs that unknowingly commit a tort that a court later decides falls
into the judicially expanded definition of customary international law. 153
Such uncertainty will harm U.S. investment activity abroad, as
companies can less readily assess their legal risks before investing.
Furthermore, such increased liability will affect the prices at which a U.S.-
based MINC is willing to operate abroad, since covering the cost of
increased risks increases the price of products produced abroad. An
expanded ATCA will also end up injuring those countries dependent on
U.S.-based MNC investments for jobs and economic growth.1 54 Any level
of corporate activity in a nation with a poor human rights record, or lower
environmental standards, would be discouraged, in effect forcing the ATCA
to act as a preemptive sanction against such economically struggling
nations. 55  While it is an ideal goal for foreign governments to strictly
enforce their laws on these issues, it has been shown, at least in this case,
that laws are being enforced by host governments. 156 Voluntary corporate
governance of these issues is also a goal which should be worked toward,
but the ATCA is not the best way to enforce compliance with
environmental and labor standards.
Furthermore, not only will frequent and frivolous ATCA claims harm
U.S. investment initiatives abroad, but publicized ATCA claims against
corporations already operating on foreign soil may discourage shareholder
investment. It has recently been noted that many socially-conscious
investors will withdraw funds from companies implicated in illegal activity
152 Flores, 343 F.3d at 150. This Filartiga-style analysis is also supported by the
Supreme Court in the majority opinion of the Sosa decision. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765-66.
153 Pia Zara Thadhani, Note, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the
Answer?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619, 634 (2000).
154 See generally MARBER, supra note 11 (uncertainty of investment). See also RATNER &
STEPHENS, supra note 140, at 233-38.
155 Thadhani, supra note 153, at 635.
156 Flores, 343 F.3d at 144.
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or human rights abuses abroad.157 Therefore, snowballing ATCA liability
and the publicized nature of such claims, even when frivolous, will
unwarrantedly injure corporations' shareholder relations.
2. Alternative Forums and Double Recovery as a Competitive
Disadvantage
The Second Circuit in Flores noted that SPCC was fined and subjected
to legal proceedings by the Peruvian government for its pollution of the Ilo
area. 58 Therefore, at least in this case, an alternative forum existed for
ATCA tort claims, and foreign tort laws were enforced in the host
country. 159 Thus, the policy of allowing claims under the ATCA cannot
always be justified by an argument that corporations can operate illegally
without fear of liability without the ATCA.16 0  The issue of alternative
forum was discussed at length by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York in the Aguinda case. 161 The court suggested that the
availability of an alternative forum alone may be enough to defeat an
ATCA claim, as it does under the TVPA. 16 The Aguinda court argued that
even if Texaco participated in a violation of international law that would
support the claim here brought under the ATCA, neither that assumption
nor any of the other considerations special to these cases materially
alters the balance of private and public interest factors that "tilt[s]
strongly in favor of trial in the foreign forum.,
163
In addition to foreign forums, alternative forums available to plaintiffs
who claim human rights abuses under the ATCA include the International
Military Tribunal (which held the Nuremburg Trials), and the tribunals
established under United Nations Resolution 827.164
Therefore, adequate alternative forums exist, because even if host
countries fail to enforce laws against U.S.-based MNCs, the international
tribunals offer an alternative. Furthermore, and more importantly, it is clear
that in at least some cases, foreign governments are prosecuting and
157 John G. Scriven, Corporate Responsibility and Regulating the Global Enterprise, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW 153, 163-64 (2002).
158 Flores, 343 F.3d at 144.
159 See Kieserman, supra note 24, at 883 (arguing that the ATCA should be enforced to
check the power of MNCs abroad and assure that they adhere to legal standards).
160 See id.
161 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 538-43.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 554 (quoting Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106).
164 Robert J. Peterson, Comment, Political Realism and the Judicial Imposition of
International Secondary Sanctions: Possibilities from John Doe v. Unocal and the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 5 U. CH. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 277, 283 (1998).
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sanctioning MNCs for their activities, as in Flores.'65 However, Aguinda's
suggestion that an ATCA claim be disallowed where an alternative forum
exists has not been adopted by other courts. Therefore, it is plausible that
MNCs will pay twice, once by paying foreign sanctions, and again by being
prosecuted in U.S. court under an ATCA claim. Thus, U.S.-based MNCs
are at a competitive disadvantage to foreign-based MNCs whose home
countries do not have an ATCA-like statute. This may begin to discourage
corporations who plan to do international business from incorporating in the
United States, and thus have detrimental effects on the U.S. economy.
3. Legal Costs
A recent article on the ATCA included a quote from Competitive
Enterprise Institute President Fred Smith, in which he observed of the
ATCA, "If you're a business and you haven't yet been sued under this law,
don't worry, you will be.', 166 This quote demonstrates the concern in the
business community over the skyrocketing legal costs that impending
ATCA cases could cause. Companies are gearing up for the costs of
zealous defense against rising ATCA claims, taking valuable time and
money away from corporate productivity at home and abroad.
For example, in the Flores case, SPCC filed a motion for summary
judgment on March 5, 2001.168 The motion was not ruled upon by the
District Court until July 16, 2002.169 In the interval, the court suggested
"extensive and supplemental briefing to apprise the court fully of all
relevant questions of customary international law and the adequacy of the
Peruvian forum.", 70 If the Circuit continues to seriously entertain extending
jurisdictional grants to plaintiffs claiming torts as nebulous as "right to
life," "right to health" and "right to sustainable environment,"' and
suggest full briefing and discovery, the legal costs for MNCs implicated in
ATCA actions will be considerable. While it may be argued that the costs
of re-filing may be burdensome and thus discourage foreign plaintiffs, the
contingent fee arrangement, unique to the U.S. legal system, may alleviate
this burden and allow for multiple re-filings.
4. Forum Shopping
The legal costs referenced in the above section multiply as plaintiffs
165 Flores, 343 F.3d at 144.
166 Jenna Greene, Gathering Storm: Suits that Claim Overseas Abuse are Putting U.S.
Executives on Alert and Their Lawyers on Call, LEGAL TiMEs, July 21, 2003, at 1.
167 Greene, supra note 166, at 1.
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are allowed to game the system by re-filing the same claim under an
ATCA-friendly label in an ATCA-friendly Circuit. As mentioned, in the
Flores case, the plaintiffs filed claims based on the Ilo pollution in the Fifth
Circuit and, upon dismissal, renamed their environmental claims as claims
for "right to life," "right to health," and "right to sustainable environment,"
re-filing them in the Second Circuit.172 The legal costs and the costs to the
judicial system for continued re-filing of such cases is an unfair burden on
U.S.-based MNCs 173 and the U.S. Judicial system. These costs, combined
with the various consequences above, militate toward restricting, if not
barring, liability against U.S.-based MNCs under the ATCA.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Flores failed to set a workable standard for the
consideration of ATCA claims against private U.S.-based MNCs acting in
their private capacity. The court ignored the complex, compelling
precedent on this issue, which mandates a threshold consideration of private
liability. Furthermore, the court failed to consider sounder alternatives to
straight Filartiga analysis, such as the Unocal private liability threshold or
construction in pari materia with the Congressional guidance provided by
the TVPA. These alternatives provide a more predictable, workable
standard that holds U.S.-based MNCs accountable for human rights
violations abroad (as in Unocal), but stops short of allowing snowballing
liability for lesser environmental torts, which can and should be addressed
by host countries. The Unocal standard should be adopted by the Circuits,
or mandated by the Congress, as an answer to the Supreme Court's failure
to directly address the issue of corporate ATCA liability in Sosa.
MNCs based in the United States should not be put at a disadvantage
to IVNCs based in other countries because of an arcane but cleverly revived
domestic law, the application of which could lead to considerable
competitive disadvantage and a legal quagmire the likes of which the U.S.
judiciary has never encountered. The ATCA, interpreted as it was in
Flores, makes U.S.-based MNCs the "deep-pocket" legal target of
plaintiffs attorneys and millions of foreign workers. The dire
consequences of its overuse must be avoided, and those interested in the
rights of workers must look to international corporate behavioral standards
and host-country activism to regulate the activity of MNCs operating
throughout the world.
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173 See Bradley, supra note 11, at 471.
